

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1634

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Yuzo ISONO, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 14 Items, dated 1934 - , 1937, and described as follows: File: Important Decisions re: International and National Policies, 1934-1937.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives of files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this
18th day of June, 1946.

/Sign/ Y. Isono
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: Nagahara Odo /Sign/

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, William C Trout, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
18th day of June, 1946

/Sign/ William C Trout
NAME

Witness: Claire Stefanelli /Sign?

Investigator IPS
Official Capacity

Doc. 1634 - Cat.

「ワシントン」文書局 第 一 六 三 四 號
證 明 書
國 際 検 察 部

典據及ビ公正ニ關スル証明

余、磯野 ユーゾー / ISOEO, YUNO / ハ余ガ下記ノ資
格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府
ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシ
テ余ガ茲ニ添付セラレタル、十四項ヨリ成ル、一
九三四一—一九三七年附、下記題名、即チ繰込—自
一九三四年至一九三七年對外、對内政策ニ關スル
重要決定ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトラ茲ニ証明
ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書
ナルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式
書類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトラ證明ス。(若シアラバ
綴巻號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所
在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ) 外務省

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 六月十八日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

右ノ右ノ公的資格

証

人

磯野 ユーゾー / Y. ISOEO / 署名 /

尾戸長春 / ODO. Nagaharu / 署名 /

No. 1634-Cert.

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ウィリアム・シー・ブラウト / William C. Brout /
ハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノ
ナルコト、竝ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公務上、日本
政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ
茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ六月十八日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 編 ウィリアム・シー・ブラウト
/ William C. Brout / 署名 /

右ノ者ノ公的資格 國際紅十字會主席官

証 人 クレタ・ステファネリ
/ Stefanelli, Claire / 署名 /

(Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File)

The Third Administrative Policy Toward North China.

Determined by the Ministries Concerned on February 20, 1937.

(Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File)

"IMPORTANT DECISION RE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL POLICIES".

Question Concerning Policy Towards China.
(7 December 1934)

I. General principle

1. The fundamental principle of our policy towards China lies (a) in making China follow the policy of the Empire to insure peace in East Asia by cooperation and mutual aid among Japan, Manchukuo and China, with the Empire as centre, as well as (b) in developing our commercial right in China.
2. In view of the present situation in China, however, it is not only most difficult for us to quickly attain the object given in (a) of Article 7, by enforcing our policy against the political situation in China, but there is also danger of bringing about a contrary effect, if we are to carry out such a policy in haste. We must try to attain our object step by step.
3. On the other hand, development of our commercial right in China, namely our building a firm economic stand in China, is not only in itself the basis of our policy towards China, but also is it an effective measure to control China with our influence and compel her to seek to approach us. In order to develop the commercial right given above, it is necessary for us to strictly correct the anti-Japanese attitude of the central and local governments, while paying attention to the maintenance of public order in various places in China which have close economic relations with Japan, and also growing an atmosphere among the general government officials and people to depend on Japan.
4. Our side, therefore, should avoid, under the present circumstances, to take forcible measures going against the natural transition of the Chinese political situation. We should rather act in such a way as to lead their natural transition favorably for us and enforce earnestly and persistently the plans which are considered necessary for us in view of the actual condition in China, with the result that side by side with an absolute deadlock

in the domestic administration of China, which is considered a natural outcome of the transition of the Chinese political situation, we force China, after all, into such a situation that she is finally compelled to approach us.

II. Gist of Policy

1. General policy

(a) Although we should act with the idea to impress the Chinese government officials and people all the more with the firm resolution on our side that if the Chinese side continues her policy to destroy the peace in East Asia without awakening to its general situation, we will not give up requesting China to correct herself. We should take a strict and fair attitude towards her that if the Chinese side actually shows sincerity for a new turn in the Japanese-Chinese relations, but we must not seek friendship of our own accord. In case the Chinese trespass on our right, we should adopt necessary steps according to our own particular stand.

It is further necessary to pay attention to reforming the anti-Japanese policy, availing ourselves of their interior struggles.

(b) It would be inevitable that if we should cause agitation in the political situation in China as the result of our taking measures necessary for the protection of our interest as is stated above. Otherwise, we must not so act as to especially complicate the situation in China. We should develop our commercial right by paying attention to the maintenance of public order in various places of China, especially in those places which are closely connected with Japan economically, in order to develop the atmosphere among the general government officials and people to depend upon Japan, while, as to the anti-Japanese movement, we should firmly request that it should be given up.

(c) The Chinese psychology of befriending distant states and of antagonizing neighbors, which is the greatest obstacle for Japan and China to approach to each other, namely the psychology which makes China trust to chance to check Japan by borrowing foreign power, should be excluded with all our might, as well as various movements based on this psychology and the corresponding support given to China by foreign countries. For this purpose, diplomatic and economic policy should be enforced in a positive manner.

2. Policy towards the Nanking regime.

As the guiding principle of the National government fundamentally differs from the Empire's policy towards China, our basic principle towards the Nanking regime lies in bringing it, in the end, into the situation in which the existence of the Nanking regime depends on its showing sincerity in bringing a new turn for the relations between Japan and China. For this purpose, we must carry out persistently (a) and (b) in the General Policy given above. Especially, we must request the Nanking regime to give up the anti-Japanese movement, particularly, to control the movements of the party; while, as to the solution of the pending problems and the development of our interest, we must make more positive efforts than before, and lead the Nanking regime in our favor by taking such steps as will appoint persons convenient for us to carry out our policy for the government posts under the command of the Nanking regime.

3. Policy towards the government in North China.

Although we wish for a condition that the political influence of the Nanking regime will not extend to the North China area it will be difficult to bring about such a situation quickly, unless we are determined to use an enormous actual power. Therefore, we should aim, under the present circumstances, to gradually intensify the situation so that the political influence of the Nanking regime may be deprived of its power in the North China area according to the actual condition of that area. This plan should be realized step by step. Accordingly, we are to adopt, with necessary changes, our policy towards the Nanking regime stated above towards the government in North China as well. If the government in question is powerful and shows sincerity, we should deal with it with good-will and exert ourselves for the solution of the pending problems and maintenance and development of our interest, while trying, at least, to blockade the activities of the party actually. We should replace the official posts under the command of the government in North China with such persons as are convenient for the accomplishment of our policy, in order to develop the atmosphere in which the government officials and people in North China may come to have a preoccupied idea that they do not have anti-Japanese movement in that area, until at last, by developing our interest and promoting the general atmosphere untainted with anti-Japanese color, we shall bring about the condition in which the special relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China in North China cannot be ignored, whoever the leader of the regime in North China may be.

4. Policy towards the Southwest Party and other local governments.

It is needless to say that towards the Southwest Party and the other local governments we should apply the general policy stated above and the policies which are based on it and which we apply towards the Nanking regime and the government in North China. But as it is desirable in checking the attitude of the Nanking regime against Japan that the Southwest Party, HANFU-KUANG, YUANSHAN and others should keep the condition of confiding with the Nanking regime or assume inseparable attitude with it, we should show friendship towards these governments and maintain proper connection with them, if they show good-will towards us.

The new growth of such local political governments, however, should be left to the natural transition of the political situation in China. We must be careful not to be partial in supporting the Nanking regime. We should avoid to take such steps as will help the new growth of local governments in a positive manner.

5. Policy concerning the development of commercial right.

While enforcing each policy stated above, we should try to develop our commercial right in China. We must try to attain this purpose by leading each government to our advantage. At the same time, by seeking our object widely among financial groups, as well as among people in general, in order to promote economic relations with the nation. We must further contrive to develop a general atmosphere untainted with the anti-Japanese color and bring about the condition in which the special economic relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China cannot be altered for political and other reasons.

Not Used

(Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File)

Paragraph 9.

Later, it was recognized by the respective Bureaus that the above-mentioned Paper D should be treated by the Foreign, Army and the Navy Ministries as "a description of the principle of what was agreed upon by the Section Chiefs concerned of the Army and Navy Ministries and the Foreign Ministry upon consultations under the supervision of the respective Bureaus".

.....
(Annexed Paper D)
(On separate sheet)

OUR POLICY TOWARD CHINA

(Decided by the Ministries
Concerned on 11 August 1936)

For the present, our policy toward China should be according to our foreign policy defined on 7 August 1936. It is as follows:

(Part of Item 8: beginning of Item 8, Chapters 1 and 4)

(1) Our Policy Toward North China.

The main purpose of our policy toward North China is to make the area anti-communistic and to make it friendly to Japan and Manchukuo and to secure national defense materials for Japan as well as to better its transportation facilities so that our national defense against Soviet Russia's invasion may be perfect and the cooperation and mutual assistance of Japan, Manchukuo and China may be secured. It is to be learned that the area to be turned friendly toward Japan, China and Manchukuo consists of 5 provinces in the northern part of China.

However, it is not a wise policy for Japan to try to extend our power or to try to gain administration in a hurry, since such a policy will surely cause more trouble without achieving the very object. We may say that it would be detrimental to our diplomacy toward Soviet Russia. We should rather devote ourselves to gain administration over Hopeh and Chahar first and then to get the rest of the provinces ready for economic cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and China as well as for making them anti-communistic and pro-Japanese.

Regarding the manner of our administration, we should try to realize substantial gain regardless of the denomination of our administration. Again, we should be careful not to disgrace the Nanking Government. The wisest way for us is to lead the Nanking Government to acknowledge our administration as if it were willingly entrusted to our charge. And, in our accepting it from the Nanking Government, we may place the Nanking Government under obligation. We may in turn ask a favour of the Chinese Government.

In order to gain as much as possible from this bargaining, the Japanese Central Government as well as the local Japanese officials should become one in acting rigidly as well as according to circumstances lest it should allow the Nanking Government to take the so-called double policy.

IPS DOCUMENT 1634 L

/T.N. - The following are notes written with pen on the margin of this document./

NEGOTIATION
OTA

Persons present:

Foreign Ministry --
Chief of the Bureau
KAMIMURA, Nebuichi
OTA
MATSUMURA

War Ministry --

SHIBAYAMA
SONODA

Navy Ministry --

TOYODA
HOSHINA
FUJII

T O P S E C R E T

On July 23, 1937, an agreement was reached between the Chief of East Asia Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Naval Ministry to make efforts to save the situation by the following measures:

1. As long as there is no big change in the situation, we stick to our policy of settling the incident on the spot and of non-expanding the incident, and stop further sending of troops.

2. To voluntarily and speedily evacuate our reinforced troops out of the Great Wall when we see for sure the possible conclusion of a local agreement and feel safe.

Remark: We consider we can be sure of the possible carrying out of the local agreement when the forces of FENG Chih-an have completely been moved to Paoting.

3. To declare the purport of No. 1 and No. 2 at a good opportunity.

IPS DOCUMENT 1634 L

4. To begin negotiations with the Nanking Government for adjusting our relations with China immediately after the time for evacuating our troops is fixed.

5. In the negotiation for adjusting the relation of both countries, matters will not be biased by past circumstances, and these matters should be rapidly considered by the three ministers (Foreign, War and Naval Ministries) to work out a good plan.

/T.N. Note on margin, written in ink/
Informed by Col. SHIBAYAMA at 4:00 p. m. today via telephone that --

USHIROKU, Jun, Chief of Bureau, made a protest to this agreement for the following reasons: (1) it is undesirable to stop sending and to evacuate the troops, (2) to attain the objective, unwise to write it in the agreement.

Therefore, OTA replied that the agreement, after being printed, would be sent to the War Ministry and the contents of the protest would be presented to senior officials so that the agreement may be dealt with in the proper way.

Doc 1634-L

局長

外務

局長

局長

局長

局長

局長

局長

文部

太田

昭和十二年七月二十三日外務省東亞局長及陸海軍軍務局長間三左記之儀、訂局、收拾、努力、在、コト、一致、見、多

左記

海軍

里田

陸軍

極

金田

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一、現況、文、在、變化、一、限、り、飽、現、地、解決、事、能、不、能、不、有、針、々、堅持、之、此、上、派、兵、一、年、止、之、コト

二、現、地、協、定、履行、見、据、就、一、且、我、方、於、コト、不安、之、コト、認、見、時、自主、的、二、速、増、強、部、隊、因、外、に、撤、收、之、コト

(註) 再、若、各、部、隊、保、定、方、面、一、協、定、完、了、一、自、進、就、之、見、時、以、現、地、協、定、履行、見、据、就、之、見、時、

(見、据、就、之、見、時、) 三、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト

四、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト 四、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト

五、石、國、交、調、整、二、因、を、交、渉、之、當、り、一、從、未、一、行、縣、二、提、前、之、見、時、

六、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト 六、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト

七、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト 七、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト

八、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト 八、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト

九、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト 九、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト

十、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト 十、通、商、機、會、提、前、記、二、文、二、趣、旨、を、聲明、之、コト

極秘

事変対処要項

總則

1634-M

Doc

Ca 3735

20.1

一、一般方針

今次事変、軍事行動、成果、外交措置、機宜
一、両々相俟て成るべく、速ニ之ヲ終結セシメ支那ヲシテ
誓、口定メ失ハシメ眞ニ明證且ツ恒久的ナル支那
係ヲ日支間ニ樹立シ併ニ日滿定、融和共榮ヲ定
規ラ期スルヲ本旨トス。

二、軍事行動、目途

軍事行動、最短期間内ニ支那ヲシテ戦意ヲ抛棄
セシムルヲ目途トシ兵力、行使、要地、占據、自衛ニ伴フ必要
ナル工作ヲ即結ニ適切ナル手段ヲ執ルベシトス。

三、外交措置、目途

外交措置、最短期間内ニ支那、反省ヲ促シ我が
所期スル境地ニ支那ヲ誘致スルヲ目途トシ機宜、
折衝及工作ヲス。

四、事変、終結方法並善後策

事変、終結方法並善後策、支那ヲシテ抗日、口
定メ失ハシメ従来、行懸ニ促ハサル劃期的國交
調整條件ヲ以テ外交ヲ渉ラ行フ。

五、軍事、外交及之ニ伴フ諸施設ハ國際法上許可

ルニ範圍ヲ逸脱セサル様慎重實行ス。

準則

一、兵力行使、範圍應以二方法

(1) 陸上於此兵力行使、主要地域、警備及上海方面

(2) 所要地域、對上海二並二航空作戦ヲ行フ

二、作戦、後方準備

作戦遂行、円滑ナラシムル爲認勤員、定規、非常時立法、前定等、所要二應ニ逐次國家諸般機

關、運送、戰時評價ニ転移セシム

三、北支、明朗化

北支問題、解決、日清支三國、共存共榮ヲ實現スルヲ目的トシ支那中央政府、下ニ與ニ北支ヲ明朗

ナラシムルヲ以テ本旨トス

四、中南支、明朗化

事變善後處理ニ於テ中南支ヲ日支通商貿易聯絡進及發展、永續ニ適スル事態ヲ出現セシムルヲ期ス

五、北支作戦後方地域ニ對スル措置

事變中北支作戦後方地域ニ對スル措置、敵國領土占領、觀念ヲ脱却シ、概本ヲ如ク律ス

(1) 占領地行政、之ヲ行ハズ但治安、軍、指導ニヨリ之ヲ

確立ス

(2) 政治機關、現地住民、自主的組成ニ委ヌ但之ヲ指導ニ明朗化シテ施設ヲナシム

(3) 軍事上必要ナル交通施設及物資、開發、必要ニ統制下ニ之ヲ行フ

1/12

Doc 1634-11

Doc 163 表-M

但此に及ばず、和局を脱後、國交調整ニ影響を及ぼすことナシ

六、對外國通商經濟財政關係

日及方三國間、通商並ニ經濟財政事項ニ関する交渉、即ち之ヲ戰後ノ拋棄之ニシテ主眼とし之ヲ行ふ

七、對方三國關係

軍事行動、外交措置並ニ之に伴フ諸工作、方三國ト、紛争ヲ醸スル其干涉ヲ誘致スルトナキ事、慎重に行之

八、居留民ニ對スル處置

情勢ニ依リ居留民、全面の引揚。行ヒ居留民ニ對シテ救恤ス

附 則

事變、即ち之ヲ本旨トスルモ大規模且又長期、其行使ニ堪エズ、覚悟ヲ以テ之ニ関スル所要、急遽ヲ促進シ情勢ニ即應ミテ之ヲ準備シ速ニ整ヒ置ク、トス

NO 4

Doc 1684-11

花押 花押 會七日 外務省(三大臣) 花押 一停戰提議 父那側ヨリ持出サシムル様外務省

三於二六五之書面工作ヲナス
二時局收結ノ條件ハ概テ左ノ通りトス

(四) 非武装地帯ノ設定

(一) 德花 張北龍門、延慶門頭溝、涿州、

固安永清信安、霸州興農鎮高沙

嶺ヲ達スル線(線ハ之ヲ含ム)、以東及以

北地區ヲ非武装地帯トシ右地域内ニ其部

軍ハ駐屯セザルモノトス

右地區内ノ治安ハ保安隊ヲ以テ維持ス該

保安隊ノ人員及裝備ニ関シハ別ニ定ム

ハ所ニ依ル

(2) 寶昌、張北龍門、延慶門頭溝ヲ達スル線

(線ハ之ヲ含ム)、以東及以北ニ至ル線ヲ

附近高地ニ天津附近ノ含ム地區ヲ非

武装地帯トスルニ同意ス(此點合ニ於

テモ保安隊ノ件前項ニ同意)

(3) 支那側ニ非武装地帯ノ設定ニ付(是ノ期

限ヲ附スルニテモ條件トシテ前記(一)若ハ(二)ヲ

受諾スルキ旨強ク主張スル場合ハ期限付

同意ニ差支ナシ

第二案
最後の決定
トスル

第二案
外務省ノ文
決ニ至ル

交渉ノ
經過
ニヨリ
考究
スル

外務省ノ交渉
ニ依ル
第二案
最終案トシ
テキルヘ置ク

(但し期限付の場合ハ期限満了ノ際ノ措置ニ付更ニ研究ス)

(但し期限付の場合ハ期限満了ト共ニ新ニ滿支國境ニ沿フ地區ニ一定ノ線(例ハ長城ヨリ三〇軒)ヲ劃シテ非武装地帯ヲ設定スルノ了解ヲ確立シ置クモトス)

(乙) 帝國ノ許與シ得ル限度

(1) 必要ニ應シ我方駐屯軍ノ兵數モ事変勃發時ノ兵數ノ範圍内ニ於テ出テ得ル限リ自發的ニ縮スルノ意向アル旨表示ス

(2) 塘沽停戰協定

(之ニ準據シ成立セル各種約束ヲ含ム、但し北平申合ニ準據セル各種申合即チ(1)長城諸關門ノ接收(2)通車(3)設關(4)通郵(5)通空ハ解消セラルモトス)土肥原秦德純協定及梅津何應欽協定ハ之ヲ解消ス(尤モ現ニ河北者ハ進出シ居ル中央軍ハ有外ニ撤退スヘキコト勿論ナリトス)

但し右非武装地帯内ノ排日抗日ノ取締及赤化防止ヲ嚴ニスルコトヲ約セシム

(3) 冀察及冀東ヲ解消シ南京政府ニ於テ任意右地域ノ行政ヲ行フコトニ同意ス
但し右地域ノ行政首腦者ハ日支融和ノ具

現二通を以て其の意を以て之を論ず

西國開通以來二載以上日本經濟合作通商
ヲ協定スルニ至リ日本經濟合作通商
講某他二條に合作タリト論ず

(註)果實、經濟差を以て、肝に之を文
藝引、之を利用スルに據る處又(キエト)

(四)以上(四)三條協定に對シ又ハ引續、從
末、行數に之を以て日本國支調整三關に

文涉ヲ行フモノト其案(別)三具ス

備考

一前記日支間停戰、諸合成立シ支那軍隊、

非武装狀態外撤收及中興軍、河北省外撤

退ヲ見タル兵軍、撤收ヲ開始スルモノト

(元)前記諸合成立シ、適宜我ハ撤收、意

向テ(聲明)

二尚存停戰、諸合成立シ、日本日支双方、

從來、行數にリテ、日本、二兩國ノ親善ヲ

具現セシメ、ニ、ニ、ニ、ニ、ニ、ニ、ニ、ニ、

聲明スルモノト

先哲曰：『君子之
德，如風之草，
上之化下，
不可及也。』

秘極

- 一又抑、滿洲國を今後問題トセム、納蒙を隱微、
間ニ入ス。
- 二日支間防共協定(非武装地帯内、防共ニ係
リテ當然實現セリ(キ)同地帯ニ関シテ、特ニ取
締メ最嚴ニス)
- 三停戰條件ニシテ其東北冀察ヲ解酒セシム、日
本内業及鐵道運送面ニ就テモ南京トノ間ニ適合
シ南京トシテ我方ノ正當ナル要望(概テ前記ニ
ニ包含セラル)ヲ容ルべシトナシ、同方面ヨリ南
京ノ勢カヲ排除スルカ如キナラナクナラズ
- 四支那、全國ニ亘リ抗日排日ヲ最嚴ニ取締リ邦交敦
睦令ヲ撤消スルニシテ(非武装地帯内、排日抗日
ニ関シテ最嚴ニ取締メ最嚴ニス(キ)而論ナリ)

本協定書
同、関係
地方、

- (一) 上海停戰協定、解消ハ支那側ヨリ強キ希望アリ
 リタニ島合科引三十令州用トモ上之同意ト
 (二) 自田絶行ニ終止スルヲト

2007

- (一) 特產品，關稅率引下
(二) 種桑梓林業易，多集十儿院共社非武裝民隊
- 海商三於十七支那側密輸取辦，自由恢復

Doc. 1634-Cert.

証 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 一 六 三 四 號

國 際 検 察 部 第 一 六 三 四 號

典 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 証 明

余、磯野 ユーゾー / ISOEO, YUZO / ハ余ガ下記ノ資
格ニ於テ、即チ外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府
ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、並ニ該官吏トシ
テ余ガ茲ニ添付セラレタル、十四項ヨリ成ル、一
九三四―一九三七年附、下記題名、即チ綴込―自
一九三四年至一九三七年對外、對内政策ニ關スル
重要決定ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトラ茲ニ証明
ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書
ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式
書類及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトラ証明ス。(若シアラバ
綴番號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所
在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ) 外務省

千九百四十六年 / 昭和二十一年 / 六月十八日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格

証

人

磯野 ユーゾー / K. ISOEO / 署名 /

尾戸長春 / ODO. Nagaharu / 署名 /

Box 1634 - Cost.

公式入手三編スル證明

余、ウイリアム・シー・ブラウト / William C. Brout / 署名

ハ、余方聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノ
ナルコト、並ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余ガ公認上、日本
政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ

茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ六月十八日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 ウイリアム・シー・ブラウト

/ William C. Brout / 署名

右ノ者ノ公同署名 國際警察部副官

証 人

シテ・ミテナリ

/ Stetphen H. Chaire / 署名

證 明 書


余、ジェイムス・ホイット / JAMES HOYT / ハ茲
ニ左記ノ如ク證明ス。

記

- 一 余ハ連合國最高指揮官總司令部國際檢察部文書
課々長代理ニシテ、且ツ本職ノ任トシテ右檢察
部ノ入手ニ係ル總テノ書類ノ原本或ハ寫シノ保
持、保管、管理ニ當ルモノナルコト、
- 二 右ノ書類中ニ國際檢察部文書第一六三四號 M ノ
寫シ一部存在シタルモ、又ハ日本外務省ノ公文
書綴ノ一部ヲナシ且ツ國際檢察部ガ同省ヨリ入
手シタルモノナルコト。
- 三 右文書ハ國際檢察部一職員ガ遺失シ未ダ所在ヲ
發見スルニ到ラズ。
- 四 證據トシテ提出サルベキ上記文書ノ日本文寫シ
ハ、右原文ノ正値ナル寫シナルコトヲ更ニ茲ニ
證明ス。

一九四八年一月七日

ジェイムス・ホイット / 署名 /
/ JAMES HOYT /



1634 M

3735-B

CERTIFICATE

I, JAMES HOYT, hereby certify:

1. That I am Acting Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP: as such I have possession, custody and control of original or copies of all documents obtained by the Section.

2. That among such documents was a copy of IPS Document No. 1634M which formed part of the official files of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and was obtained by the International Prosecution Section from that ministry.

3. The same has been mislaid by a member of the International Prosecution Section who is unable to locate it.

4. It is further certified that the Japanese copy of the above-described document to be tendered in evidence is an exact copy thereof.



JAMES HOYT

Dated: 7 January 1948

1634M

證 明 書

余、ジェイムス、ホイト / JAMES HOYT / ハ茲
ニ左記ノ如ク證明ス。

記

- 一 余ハ連合國最高指揮官總司令部國際檢察部文書
課々長代理ニシテ、且ツ本職ノ任トシテ右檢察
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持、保管、管理ニ當ルモノナルコト、
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寫シ一部存在シタルモ、又ハ日本外務省ノ公文
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- 三 右文書ハ國際檢察部一職員ガ遺失シ未ダ所在ヲ
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- 四 證據トシテ提出サルベキ上記文書ノ日本文寫シ
ハ、右原文ノ正幅ナル寫シナルコトヲ更ニ茲ニ
證明ス。

一九四八年一月七日

ジェイムス、ホイト / 署名 /
/ JAMES HOYT /